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THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
A VIEW OF INTENT AND PR ACTICE
DANIEL A. DREYFUS* and HELEN M. INGRAM**

INTRODUCTION

Policy performance usually falls short of policy promise. Creative
and innovative intentions boldly stated in the preambles of legisla
tion become diluted and deferred in the practical chore of translating
what legislatures say into what government does. Causes for the per
formance gap are legion, and any policy which aims at innovative
change is bound to face frustration in application. However, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) 1 is an exception
to the general rule that the targets and goals of the formulators of
policy ebb away as the implementors take over. In NEPA's case, the
objectives were expanded during implementation, and the impact of
the Act was enhanced beyond initial expectations.
Participants in the legislative process did not generally agree that
the passage of NEPA would have much positive impact upon public
policy. Contemporary documents reveal that the Nixon administra
. tion had aggressively opposed enactment of the measure throughout
the legislative process, and the President's signature on January I,
1970, was a belated and lukewarm acquiescence to growing national
concern with the environment. Most members of Congress, more
over, probably did not appreciate the potential scope and signif
icance of the measure. The news media and environmental interest
groups displayed little appreciation for the portent of the legislation.
The New York Times of January 2, 1970, for example, barely noted
the new requirement for preparation of environmental impact state
ments, and a headline referred to Senator Henry M. Jackson as
"Sponsor of Pollution Control Bill."
In place of the attrition of commitment which usually occurs in
implementation, this article argues that the goals of NEPA have been
reinterpreted and in many ways extended beyond those intended by
the sponsors. The thousands of column inches of public praise or
*Deputy Staff Director for Legislation, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
U.S. Congress.
**Associate Professor, Dep't. of Political Science and Director, Institute of Government
Research, Univ. of Ariz.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., 83 Sat. 852 (1970).
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vilification of NEPA printed since 1970 and the volumes of legal
arguments, judicial opinions, and administrative rules and regulations
dedicated to its interpretation are testimony to its significance. As
this essay and the ones which follow in this symposium issue
indicate, there is a good deal of disagreement among NEPA scholars
about the locus and extent of the impact. There is little question,
though, that NEPA has changed the influence of participants in
environmental policymaking.
Indeed, as the other four contributions on NEPA demonstrate, the
most fruitful and interesting subject for research is not simply
whether NEPA is being implemented, but how the law has affected
who participates and with what leverage in decisionmaking. A prelim
inary subject to be addressed here is how the uniquely aggressive
implementation of NEPA came about.
The purposes of this introductory essay are twofold. First, the aim
is to revisit the legislative process, to recreate the decisionmaking
context, and to recall the motives and intentions of several key legis
lative actors. We have a privileged perspective for this task. One of
the authors writes from the vantage point of a staff member of the
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and one of two key
aides to Senator Jackson during the formulation of NEPA legislation.
Second, this article will comment upon events-again from the frame
of reference of a close observer and staff participant with some
insight into congressional intent-which have occurred in a half
dozen years of implementation.
CONTEXT OF THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

The context and orientation of the legislative process is ordinarily
remedial. It aims to correct an ill or to restructure or replace a
sagging institution. Commentators on NEPA have combed the public
record in vain for extensive future-oriented analysis by participants
of how the mechanisms and institutions to be established by the law
should operate. 2 Far more fruitful for unraveling the legislative
intents of NEPA are the participants' perceptions and diagnoses of
the ailments of existing institutions and mechanisms. Remarking on
the extent to which the existing decisionmaking context dominated
Congressional consideration of NEPA, Frederick R. Anderson ob
served:
... the largest portion of NEPA's legislative history is taken up with
establishing the dynamics of environmental systems, diagnosing the
2. R. Liroff, NEPA and Its Aftermath: The Formation of a National Policy for the Envi
ronment, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern, 1975).
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extent of environmental harm insofar as it is known (and calling for
study and measurement of what is not yet known), identifying the
federal institutional shortcomings which contribute to environ
mental deterioration, and endorsing the need for comprehensive
federal planning, coordination and decisionmaking under a unified
national policy. The subject of enforcement of such a policy on the
working level in federal agencies did not command Congress' full
attention at any point. 3

The context in which the National Environmental Policy Act was
formulated was one in which economic management had long been
an accepted government function. An essential objective of govern
ment throughout the history of the U.S. had been to promote
economic growth. Early frontier expansionism had been replaced by
the progressive conservation ethic of the l 900's, which espoused wise
use of natural resources. Sustained yield and public stewardship had
replaced exploitation, but the goal of management, both public and
private, was still economic gain. Even the preservationists of the
l 950's and l 960's did not challenge the ascendency of economics as
it applied to most issues. They simply maintained that some places
had very great value which was difficult to quantify.
The idea incorporated in the policy statement of NEPA that valu
able economic opportunity might in some instances be foregone in
order to achieve an environmental goal was a significant shift of
policy premises. Such a revolution in values applied to government
decisionmaking would require an extraordinary mechanism to dis
play and weigh environmental effects of proposed actions, just as
economic effects had long been considered.
The National Environmental Policy Act was formulated within a
context of widely-shared criticism of administrative fragmentation in
the handling of natural resources and the environment. The Hoover
Commission had long since identified and deplored the conflicting
and overlapping missions of myriad agencies and bureaus dealing
with natural resources. The solution proposed then, and again seri
ously considered by the Eisenhower administration, was a Depart
ment of Natural Resources. 4
In the late l 960's, when NEPA was debated, the vanguard con
cerned with environmental policy added ecological irrationality to
the case against executive branch fragmentation. Criticis of existing
governmental machinery realized that every decision-to grant re3. F. Anderson, NEPA in the Courts: A Legal Analysis of the National Environmental
Policy Act 1 (1973).
4. Mister Z, The Case for a Department of Natural Resources, 1 Nat. Res. J. 197-206
(1961).
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search funds, to construct a public works project, to lease public
lands-has environmental implications. They noted that the impact
of government upon the environment was in fact comprehensive, but
administrative treatment was piecemeal. The mission of each agency
was narrowly defined and responsive to some specific federal con
cern, such as proprietorship over public lands and navigable waters or
interstate or international aspects of fisheries and game management.
The newer environmentally-oriented functions of air and water pollu
tion control were equally narrowly assigned and were primarily a
response to crisis situations which had not been adequately treated
by state and local government.
The challenge was to approach environmental management in a
comprehensive way. The new values of environmental policy had to
intrude somehow into the most remote recesses of the federal admin
istrative machinery and begin to influence the multitude of decisions
being made by thousands of officials. The functions of government
involved were too diverse to be unified organizationally. Imposing a
comprehensive policy within the organizational arrangement was the
ambition which Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.) had for environ
mental impact statements. In a floor speech insisting upon the Senate
version of the measure, which established the impact statement
procedure, Jackson said:
There are about 80 major Federal agencies with programs under
way which affect the quality of the human environment. If environ
mental policy is to become more than rhetoric, and if the studies
and advice of any high-level, advisory group are to be translated into
action, each of these agencies must be enabled and directed to par
ticipate in active and objective-oriented environmental management.
Concern for environmental quality must be made part of every
Federal action. 5

Serious shortcomings in environmental information and a lack of
established legitimacy in environmental expertise were recognized as
other impediments to environmental decisionmaking. Traditionally,
economic impacts of resource development decisions were well docu
mented in justification, but decisionmakers were supplied very little
information about environmental impacts. One of the charges raised
by conservationists in preservation battles, for example, Echo Park
and the Grand Canyon Dam controversy, was that agencies such as
the Park Service or the Fish and Wildlife Service, which might be
expected to generate information, were muzzled by department
5. 115 Cong. Rec. 29087 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
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secretaries. 6 Further, decisionmakers had far less respect for environ
mental information than for economic data, which were clothed in
the accepted benefit-cost analysis and backed by established rules
and procedures.
The need for sounder environmental information was identified
repeatedly at the joint House-Senate colloquium to discuss a national
policy for the environment held in July 1968. For instance, Law
rence Rockefeller observed:
The area where greater knowledge would help is the resource deci
sion-making process. Many federal resource decisions are still made
on a benefit-cost ratio which does not adequately reflect environ
mental factors. We know-or are told-precisely what the dollar
benefits are for flood control, irrigation, or highway traffic-but no
one can tell us the cost of various alternatives in long-term environ
mental values. 7

The environmental impact statement mechanism was relied upon
by the authors of NEPA to alter the existing decisionmaking context,
so that henceforth environmental effects might be assigned greater
significance in decisionmaking.
GENESIS OF NEPA

Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that "nothing is new under the
sun," but the policymaking process certainly draws heavily for its
raw material upon concepts which have been employed before. There
are several impediments to original ideas in policymaking, aside from
the obvious scarcity of creative genius which plagues all forms of
human endeavor. Public policymaking imposes decisionmaking costs.
There is brisk competition for the time and energies of principal
decisionmakers, and they cannot afford to invent new techniques for
every problem. Furthermore, concepts which are familiar are easily
communicated, while departures must be described in tedious detail
in the course of legislative debate. Once a policy approach has been
put into practice, a body of experience is acquired which serves as a
referent for further applications of the same or similar techniques. In
any event, if sufficient inquiry is made, most policy concepts can be
identified as extensions or adaptations of approaches which have
been used before.
6. 0. Stratton & P. Sirotkin, The Echo Park Controversy (1959); H. Ingram, Patterns of
Politics in Water Resource Development: A Case Study of New Mexico's Role in the Colo
rado River Basin Bill (1969).
7. Hearings of the Joint House-Senate Colloquium to Discuss a National Policy for the

Environment, Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs and the House
Comm. on Science and Aeronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6 (1968).
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There are three distinct parts to NEPA; each was conceived sepa
rately and derived from separate sources. They are:
1. Establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality (Title II)
2. An explicit declarationof a national environmental policy (Sec
tion 101)
3. A direction to all agencies of the federal government to carry out
certain functions-the "action-forcing mechanism" (Sections 102
through 105)

Council on Environmental Quality
The phylogeny of the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ)
can be traced directly to the model of the Employment Act of 1946,
which established the Council of Economic Advisors to the Pres
ident. 8 The 1946 Act was a formal recognition of the government's
responsibility for maintenance of economic health and for the eco
nomic impacts of its activities. Over the years national economic
efficiency was established as an objective for a wide range of govern
mental programs. Basic economic data were collected, and economic
criteria were established to evaluate projects. Establishment of the
Council of Economic Advisors symbolized this development and pro
vided an institutional mechanism for monitoring economic well
being.
The Resource and Conservation Act, proposed in 19 59, was a
direct, section-by-section parallel to the Employment Act. Sponsored
by Senator Murray, the bill declared "a national policy on conserva
tion, development, and the utilization of natural resources and for
other purposes." 9 It required an annual Presidential Resources and
Conservation Report, establishment of a Council of Resources and
Conservation Advisors to the President, and organization of a Joint
Congressional Committee on Resources and Conservation.
Substantial considerations supported application of economic
policy approaches to environmental management. Environment, like
economics, pervades governmental actions. The aim of the proposed
Resources and Conservation Act was to give similar legitimacy to
environmental concerns and to provide continuing review of the
cumulative impact of federal actions upon environmental matters. Of
course, in 1960 environment was very narrowly defined to include
only recreational, wildlife, scenic, and scientific values and enhance
ment of the national heritage for future generations.
No action was taken on Senator Murray's bill, but the concepts
8. Employment Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § § 1021-25 (1964).
9. S. 2549, 8th Cong. (1959).
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were perpetuated in various forms, and ultimately some of them
became the major legislative objectives of both the Jackson bills and
Congressman John Dingell's (D-Mich.) House companion measure.
The notion of a presidential advisory council or board and the annual
report remained a central theme of the NEPA bills of the 91 st Con
gress. A joint committee on environment was proposed and nearly
established in 1970 but was not a part of successful NEPA measures.
The structure and functions of the CEQ were major questions in
the legislative history of NEPA. The Nixon administration preferred
its own small advisory body in the executive office. Congressman
Dingell and Senator Jackson were committed to a body with suffi
cient stature to be influential in the executive branch and with
sufficient staff capability to monitor and advise upon the state of the
environment.
National Environmental Policy
The Murray bill, after the fashion of the Employment Act, began
with a short statement of national policy. As enacted in NEPA, the
statements of goals and objectives were a good deal more sophis
ticated. The essential building blocks of an environmental policy
statement, though not widely discussed, were articulated by the
environmental vanguard throughout the l 960's. Professor Lynton
Caldwell as early as 1963 had suggested "environmental administra
tion" as the focus for public policy. He noted that:
Examination of the recent literature of human ecology, public
health, natural resources management, urbanism and development
planning suggests a growing tendency to see environment as a policy
framework within which many specific problems can be solved. 1 0

In 1965 the President's Science Advisory Committee also recog
nized broad political and social implications for environmental affairs
and suggested that environmental quality was a citizen's right. 1 1
An unusual Senate-House colloquium, held during 1968 to discuss
a national policy for the environment, marked an important step in
the evolution of an environmental policy statement. The Congres
sional co-chairmen, Senator Henry Jackson and Congressman George
P. Miller, invited legislators, administrators, academics, and well
known citizens interested in the environment to attend. While there
was little agreement about the scope of federal concern and less upon
10. L. Caldwell, Environment: A New Focus for Public Policy, 23 Pub. Ad. Rev. 138
(Sept. 196 3 ).
11. President's Science Advisory Committee, Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,
Report of the Environmental Pollution Panel 16 (The White House 1965).
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the form which federal environmental management should take,
there was a consensus that a more explicit expression of federal
attitude toward the environment was desirable.' 2
The impetus given an explicit policy statement in the colloquium
was extended in the consideration of Senate Bill 1075, introduced by
Senator Jackson and others in the 91st Congress. As introduced,
Senate Bill 1075 was limited. It would have established an advisory
Council on Environmental Quality in the Executive Office of the
President, required an annual environmental quality report, and
vested in the Council certain broad environmental data-gathering
functions. Similar measures were under consideration in the House,
including House Resolution 6750, formulated by Congressman John
Dingell, which became the center of House action on NEPA. Both
the Jackson and Dingell bills were designed to favor the jurisdiction
of their respective committees. The Senate bill referred to the
Department of the Interior under the jurisdiction of the Senate
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, and the House bill was intro
duced as amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act
under the purview of the Merchant Marine and Fisheries Commit
tee.' 3
During the Senate hearings key legislators became convinced of
the need for a strong policy statement. Dr. Lynton Caldwell strongly
recommended that an explicit statutory policy on environmental
management be included in the bill. Following the hearing, the
Senate Interior staff worked out an amendment to Senate Bill 1075
which contained a declaration of national environmental policy; the
amendment was enacted in section 101. Specifically, the federal
government is instructed to protect and restore the environment in
accordance with a general national policy-declared by the act-that
government shall endeavor "to create and maintain conditions under
which man and nature can exist in productive harmony." One provi
sion in the amendment which did not survive the House-Senate
conference in its original form stated: "The Congress recognizes that
each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthy
environment and that each person has a responsibility to contribute
to the preservation and enhancement of the environment." 14
Though eventually stricken on the ground that its vagueness might
12. Hearings of the Joint House-Senate Colloquium, supra note 7.
13. Jurisdictional disputes imposed restraints upon the NEPA proposals throughout the
legislative process. Congressional committees handled the environment in a fragmented
manner (as did the administration); a large number of committees could, therefore, logically
assert dominion.
14. Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, S. Rep. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969).
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invite endless litigation, the provision is indicative of the sponsors'
policy objectives.

Environmental Impact Statements
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) were invented in response
to the anticipated administrative indifference or outright hostility
toward the environmental council and the environmental policy
statement. During the hearings on Senate Bill l 07 5 it became clear
that while the administration professed full concurrence with the
objectives of environmental management, it in fact recommended
against enactment of the measures then sponsored. Dr. Lee
DuBridge, the President's Science Advisor and the administration's
principal spokesman at the Interior Committee's hearing, proposed
the alternative of establishing a committee of selected cabinet mem
bers under presidential leadership to deal with environmental
issues. 1 5 Interrogation by committee members developed the fact
that the proposed cabinet council would have little or no full-time
staff support.
After the hearings Senator Jackson discussed with the committee
staff his concern that if the legislation were enacted over the adminis
tration's opposition, the newly formed Council on Environmental
Quality would be unlikely to enjoy strong presidential support. Some
other institutional arrangement seemed to be needed. He instructed
the staff to explore the concept, suggested by Dr. Lynton Caldwell
during Senate hearings, of incorporating "action-forcing" mechan
isms into the bill. In part, Dr. Caldwell suggested:
... Congress should at least consider measures to require the Federal
agencies, in submitting proposals, to contain within the proposals an
evaluation of the effect of these proposals upon the state of the
environment. 1 6

Building upon Dr. Caldwell's idea, language was drafted which would
grant authority to every federal agency to implement the environ
mental policy act as part of its established responsibilities.
As reported by the Interior Committee, Senate Bill 107 5 included
the requirement that every recommendation or report on proposals
for legislation and other major federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment include a finding by the
responsible official that the environmental impacts of the proposed
action had been studied, that unavoidable adverse impacts were
15. Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71-73 (1969).
16. Id. at 116.
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justified by other stated considerations of national policy, that long
term resource considerations had been evaluated, and that irrevers
ible and irretrievable commitments of resources were warranted. If
proposals involved unresolved environmental conflicts, alternatives
were to be studied, developed and described. In other words, what
ever the principal objective of the proposed action, the agency would
be required to explore the environmental consequences and expose
them to the consideration of any subsequent reviewers.
The measure passed the Senate, as amended by the Interior
Committee with the environmental findings provision, on July l 0,
1969, without significant debate. The ease of Senate passage was,
however, deceptive. Later in the legislative process jurisdictional and
substantive conflicts arose in both the House and the Senate.
Congressman Dingell's companion version in the House included a
very brief policy statement, requirement of an annual environmental
report, and establishment of the Council on Environmental Quality.
There was no language in the House measure regarding impact state
ments or other action-forcing provisions. It passed by a vote of 372
to 15 on September 23, 1969, but not without several important
concessions obtained by Congressman Aspinall (D-Colo.), Chairman
of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. In recognition of
the overlapping interests of Aspinall's Interior Committee with the
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, he was granted a position
on the conference committee, where he acted as a restraining force.
He also succeeded in inserting an important amendment which
affected the substance of the legislation. It stated that "nothing in
the Act shall increase, decrease, or change any responsibility of any
Federal official or agency." Had this provision not been modified by
conference and its effects mitigated by the language of the confer
ence report, this amendment would have negated the action-forcing
mechanism.
In the Senate a heated substantive and jurisdictional controversy
between the Interior and the Public Works Committees had to be
bargained to terms before the conference. In contrast to the House
settlement of the jurisdictional dispute, no members of the Senate
Public Works Committee were appointed as conferees on Senate Bill
1075. Instead, Senator Jackson agreed to support in conference
several changes in the measure which had been negotiated between
himself and Senator Muskie (D-Me.), the spokesman for the Public
Works Committee viewpoint. Two significant modifications were
made in the "action-forcing" provisions:
1. The requirement for a formal finding of environmental impact
was changed to a "detailed statement" by the responsible official.
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2. A provision was added to require consultation with environ
mental agencies in the development of environmental impact
statements and to make explicit that such statements would be
public documents widely available.

The negotiations among adversaries-both principals and staff
leading to this settlement and several others affecting other parts of
the bill were protracted and bitter. The bases of disagreement are
complex and multifaceted and are only sparsely displayed in the
public record. 1 7 The substance of the Muskie objection to the "find
ing" requirement was that it would be difficult to challenge. He
doubted that an environmental finding declared by federal agencies
would be reliable. Muskie stated:
The concept of self-policing by Federal agencies which pollute or
license pollution is contrary to the philosophy and intent of existing
environmental quality legislation. In hearing after hearing agencies of
the Federal Government have argued that their primary authoriza
tion, whether it be maintenance of the navigable waters by the Corps
of Engineers or licensing of nuclear power plants by the Atomic
Energy Commission, takes precedence over water quality require
ments.
I repeat, these agencies have always emphasized their primary
responsibilities making environmental considerations secondary in
their view. 1 8

The essence of the Muskie insistence upon interagency review of
impact statements was a desire to extend and protect the authority
of the environmental agencies under the jurisdiction of his Public
Works Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. As he said on the
Senate floor:
The requirement that established environmental agencies be con
sulted and that their comments accompany any such report would,
place the environmental control responsibility where it should be. 19

The result of the compromise version was to reduce the solemnity
of the official's responsibility to consider environmental implications
and to substitute greater outside sanctions-criticisms by other agen
cies, court challenges, or public opinion-to enforce NEPA policies.
Few significant changes were made in environmental impact state
ment provisions by the conference committee, and the compromise
was embodied in Section l 02 as enacted.
17. For a detailed discussion of the Muskie-Jackson negotiations see T. Finn, Conflict
and Compromise: Congress Makes a Law, The Passage of the National Environmental Policy
Act (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown 1972).
18. 115 Cong. Rec. 29053 (1969) (Remarks of Sen. Muskie).
19. Id.
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THE INTENT OF CONGRESS CONCERNING SECTION 102

Since NEPA was enacted, endless hours of intellectual effort have
been invested by solicitors of federal agencies, nonfederal litigants
and potential litigants, and judges and their law clerks in trying to
divine the intent of Congress from the sketchy documentation of
legislative history. The pursuit of "congressional intent," however
seriously it may be approached, has been about as scientific as the
voodoo practice of reading the future in a random pile of chicken
bones.
Clearly, no one can say except a presiding judge-and that because
of authority rather than special insight-what the intent of Congress
was with respect to Section 102. There were many House and Senate
participants in the legislative process, and each had diverse interests
and perspectives; it would be impossible to unravel their separate
intentions. At the same time, Senator Jackson's Interior and Insular
Affairs Committee staff prepared the original draft of Section 102
and participated in the later process of modifications. Therefore, the
recollections of a staff member-along with consideration of the
record-may afford some useful insight.
Above all, the impact statement was not intended merely to pro
vide data or description, but to force a change in the administrative
decisions affecting the environment. It was conceived as an action
forcing mechanism and consistently described as such by its pro
ponents. Emphasis-perhaps over-emphasis-upon environmental con
cerns was considered a necessary means of instilling the new policy
into an uncongenial decisionmaking process in which the support of
the administration was uncertain and federal agencies were wedded
to their own missions and to economic efficiency.
The principal staff members who drafted Section 102 2 0 combined
two viewpoints-that of a lawyer with an appreciation for the role of
the courts in policymaking, and that of a student of administration
and practitioner of bureaucratic infighting. Both perspectives were
useful in designing incentives and recognizing disincentives to operate
under Section 102.
It is axiomatic that nearly any significant proposal will face com
petition for allocation of scarce resources. There are more actions
proposed than federal agencies can possibly undertake, and at each
stage of the bureaucratic decision process there is a need to eliminate
some proposals. The decisionmaker must have criteria upon which
such eliminations can be based, and it was NEPA's action-forcing
intent to introduce new criteria. Consequently, a proposal accom20. William J. Van Ness Jr. and Daniel Dreyfus.

61
panied by an environmental horror story should carry a heavy handi
cap in the competition. Given a choice, an administrator is unlikely
to stake the agency's program upon proposals which must carry such
liabilities throughout the remaining review process and which face
public and political opposition as well.
The temptation for agency officials to understate the adverse
environmental consequences of favorite proposals was recognized.
Here the role of legal review was to be critical. Preparation of the
environmental impact statement was to be a statutory requirement.
There is no question that the original drafters of Senate Bill l 075
contemplated a role for the courts. The threat of litigation was
intended as an incentive to agencies to make a fair appraisal. The
requirement for interagency review comment was a further guarantee
against excessive agency bias. The members and staffs of both the
Senate Interior and Insular Affairs and the Public Works Committees
had experience with water resources programs under their jurisdic
tions. They anticipated similar interagency relationships would
emerge under NEPA. By law, proposals for water resource projects to
be constructed by federal agencies are submitted to other interested
federal agencies and to concerned states for review and comment.
The rivalry among federal water agencies is legendary, and the
interest of the states in such projects is intense. Consequently, the
comments from the interagency review process have often been
critical, have displayed in-depth technical analysis, and have been a
most fruitful source of questions for the examiners of the Office of
Management and Budget and the Congressional committees.
Congressional intent concerning the scope of actions to which
NEPA was to apply and how statements were to be prepared is
difficult to divine. The words of the Act are vague:
-The entire Section 102 was qualified by the Senate-House con
ferees with the phrase "to the fullest extent possible."
-Statements were to be prepared for "major federal actions signif
icantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
Also,
-"Alternatives" to the proposal are to be described.

The interpretations of each of these and other turns of phrase have
been argued endlessly, and the meager official legislative history
sheds little light upon intent.
Generality of wording, however, was unavoidable, since the Act
was intended to apply to numerous agencies and programs. No
precise procedures or definitions could be cast in statutory language
which would be applicable to such dissimilar undertakings as con-
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struction of a major airport, a change in grazing regulations on public
lands, the licensing activity of a regulatory commission, and granting
research funds.
Procedural details were left for executive rulemaking, as is
customarily the case. The conferees said that "the President was to
prepare a list of those agencies ..." which would participate in the
review of impact statements and to establish a time limitation for
receipt of comments from federal, state, and local agencies.2 1 Pre
sumably, similar executive amplifications of the impact statement
procedure-regarding such matters as the definition of a "major
action," retroactive applicability, occasions for generic rather than
specific statements, and other considerations-were anticipated.
There are few clues in the legislative history concerning what
NEPA's Congressional authors expected impact statements to look
like. Although the language of the act specifies "a detailed state
ment," the most active participants probably had different things in
mind. Some of the conferees were concerned that the process might
become cumbersome and delay the implementation of programs. The
few exhortations in the Conference Report that such delays be
avoided now appear naive.
It is certainly true, however, that the conferees never contem
plated anything so extravagant as the multiple volume dissertations
which now are commonly produced. This contention is bolstered by
the fact that NEPA made no provision for funding extensive addi
tional work by the federal agencies.
A PARTICIPANT'S PERSPECTIVE OF NEPA IN PRACTICE

The atmosphere in which a policy is implemented is often quite
different from that in which it is formulated.Typically, the coalition
of interests responsible for passage of a policy through Congress falls
apart, and the subsequent support for implementing policy is less
strong. It has been noted that the Congressional designers anticipated
a hostile environment for the Act's application. In fact, this unfavor
able reception did not materialize. When the language of the Act is
read in light of subsequent events, it leads inevitably to the style of
implementation which occurred.
In the early years of implementing the requirement for impact
statements, three developments occurred which transformed them
from a force operating from inside program administration (as
anticipated by the original drafters) to a force exerted from outside
21. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, H.R. Rep. No. 91-765, 91st Cong. 1st
Sess. 8-9 (1969).

63

by interest groups and courts. These included the explosion of the
environmental movement, the emergence of environmental law firms,
and the assumption by the CEQ of the role of monitor of the EIS
process.
With Earth Day, which was celebrated four months after the
passage of NEPA, the environmental issue burst into the crisis stage in
American public opinion. During the time the legislation was being
considered, the environmental issue was at what Anthony Downs
calls the pre-problem stage. 2 2 Although some legislators and the
environmental vanguard were articulating a need for environmental
management, there was no general public consciousness of environ
mental concepts. Prior to 1970 issues were taken up in discrete
fashion: opposing dams in the Grand Canyon, saving the Redwoods,
rescuing the scenic Hudson, etc. As the era of the environment
emerged, many issues were tied together as examples of a more
general problem. The public activity involved in each instance of the
general environmental problem was greatly enlarged and insistent
upon positive action. Many government agencies were called upon to
do something effective. The President, once hostile to NEPA,
embraced it and appointed committed environmentalists to the CEQ.
As a consequence, there was much more outside pressure and much
less bureaucratic resistence than the designers of NEPA expected in
the preparation and review of impact statements.
The advent of a national environmental ethic was accompanied by
a proliferation of environmentally-oriented legal firms whose expen
sive legal work was underwritten by the Ford Foundation and other
donors. As noted earlier, the architects of NEPA clearly foresaw a
role for the courts in enforcing environmental policy. Landmark
cases predated the enactment of NEPA, such as the High Mountain
Sheep Dam on the middle Snake River 2 3 and Storm King Mountain
pumped storage powerplant on the Hudson, 2 4 but these were infre
quent and associated only with prominent issues. No one in the
NEPA policymaking process, however, could have forseen that talent
and funds would become available to pursue hundreds of cases
involving matters of purely regional or even local concern. A result of
the expanded legal action was that almost any environmental impact
statement might be challenged in the courts. The courts, in turn,
generally took a critical attitude toward agency compliance with the
Act.
22. A. Downs, Up and Down With Ecology: The "Issue-Attention Cycle," 28 Pub. Inter
est 38-50 (Summer 1972).
23. Udall v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
24. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n. 453 F.2d 463,
492 (Second Cir. 1971).
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The shape of NEPA implementation also was greatly influenced by
the President's decision to delegate to the newly-established CEQ
responsibility for issuing guidelines for agency implementation of
NEPA. Such a delegation was by no means necessary; in fact, legisla
tive history indicates that the designers thought the Bureau of the
Budget would supervise the 102 process, just as it served as overseer
of benefit-cost evaluations. 2 5 On the one hand, the role of CEQ as
umpire of the NEPA process has further diversified its often conflict
ing roles as a monitor of the nation's environmental health,. advisor
to the President, and public ombudsman,2 6 and these built-in con
tradictions have hampered the agency in the performance of its tasks.
On the other hand, CEQ handling of NEPA has marked the process
with the Council's particular perspective. Unlike the Bureau of the
Budget (now 0MB), which is responsible to the President alone, CEQ
is dependent upon environmental groups for political support. It is
likely that CEQ has been less sensitive to the dynamics of organiza
tion and administration and more sympathetic to environmental
political forces and to public participation than the central budgeting
agency would have been.
Modification of the initial action-forcing concept which began
with the Muskie-Jackson compromises was greatly extended by the
events just chronicled. The initial approach-a formal "finding" by
the responsible official-was intended to internalize the influence of
environmental concerns upon agency decisionmaking. Changes in
legislative language combined with environmental activism have
served to transform the impact statement process into a tool for
"external," public participatory policymaking. The change has had a
number of unfortunate, dysfunctional consequences.
Because of CEQ guidelines and court action, environmental impact
statements were required for actions in which decisions had already
been made and to which administrative agencies were already com
mitted. The consequences of this retroactive application, however
desirable it might be in the abstract, profoundly affected early imple
mentation of the Act. It created instantly an incredible backlog of
impact statements which had to be prepared on what were essentially
irrevocable decisions-projects under construction, programs under
way, and the like.
More significantly, it was often these advanced actions and pro
posals which set the unfortunate tone for early implementation of
NEPA. Militant environmental groups grasped the opportunities for
25. See, e.g., remarks in Senate National Environmental Policy, Hearings at 117-124.
26. R. Llroff, The Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Law Rep.
50051-70 (1973).
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one more delaying action in conflicts they had previously lost. Agen
cies found themselves rationalizing commitments to actions which
they had no practicable abilities to modify or reverse. The best
talents in the agencies were devoted to defending old decisions made
before full consideration of their environmental impacts was re
quired.
Because of litigation, CEQ guidelines and public participation,
environmental impact statements have become too long, disjointed
and complex. The earliest environmental impact statements prepared
pursuant to the Act were perfunctory affairs. One (related to a land
use permit for a road from the Yukon River to the north slope of
Alaska) was only eight typewritten pages long, including discussion
of alternatives. Another (relating to Corps of Engineers dredging
programs in the Great Lakes) required only three pages. The proper
balance between these early documents which contained too little
information, and efforts prepared today, which threaten information
overload, has yet to be struck.
The courts and CEQ's guidelines have applied two interpretations
to environmental impact statements which probably were not antic
ipated or intended by the authors of the provision:
(I) They look upon the statements as comprehensive decision docu
ments; and
(2) They view the statements as evidence of whether the agency is
complying with other provisions of NEPA.

As indicated by a specific reference in the Conference Report,
Section 102(2)(c) was patterned after the 90-day review process re
quired for water resource projects. There was an implicit assumption
by the authors that, as in the case of a water project, any major
proposal would already have been justified by economic evaluations
and that the objectives and alternatives of the proposal would have
been identified and described in the course of formulation. The
impact statement, therefore, need only amplify environmental
considerations which might otherwise have been overlooked.
As the Act was applied to programs dissimilar from water
resources, such as licensing actions of the Atomic Energy Commis
sion, it became clear that the analysis and justifications for many
federal decisions were not being documented in any formal way. At
least there was no basic decision document upon which the logic of
the proposal itself could be weighed by the public or the courts.
Environmentalists, who had been frustrated for years by their
inability to obtain written analyses supporting governmental deci
sions, sought to have a written account of the entire decision process
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included in environmental statements. The courts, sharing a need for
information, agreed. CEQ in its November 1971 guidelines deter
mined that "Environmental statements will be documents complete
enough to stand on their own. "2 7
Certainly, there is a need for public documentation of important
governmental decisions, and the complexity of such decisions re
quires that the documentation be voluminous and costly. The body
of policy concerning the public right to information appears to be
deficient in that it relates only to already prepared documents and
does not require gathering information in a public disclosure docu
ment; it also does not prescribe the level of detail required. The
responsibility has been imposed upon NEPA in this instance to en
force the fundamental public right to freedom of information con
cerning governmental activities. Environmental policies probably are
being unfairly burdened with the costs of this extra public service
and unfairly criticized for the required effort.
A final and perhaps most dangerous dysfunctional consequence
has been that of delay. The external process into which the EIS has
evolved defies the expressed intent of the Act's authors that it be
efficient. The diversity of the participants, the independence of
litigants and the judiciary, and the delays which legal actions neces
sarily entail militate against expedited decisionmaking and deprive
the responsible officials of control over timetables.
Some of the greatest strengths and most dangerous weaknesses of
NEPA stem from this transformation. The checks provided by out
side participants obviously preclude expedient action by agency offi
cials in response to parochial or political motives. Alternatively, the
process can be unresponsive to real needs for timely federal action.
Honest disagreements by courts or litigants or cynical delaying action
by interest groups could frustrate proposals which are supported by
the general public.
Most criticism of NEPA has been presented as opposition to un
justified and costly delays. Until recently, however, the critics have
had very little public credibility. With the currently increasing con
cern over energy supplies and economic stagnation, however, the
situation could change dramatically.
Current energy problems and the economic crisis facing the nation
have greatly reduced public enthusiasm for environmental constraints
upon constructive economic activity. The news media have notably
mitigated their partisan treatment of environmental issues. Oppo27. Implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act, 36 Fed. Reg. 23667
(December 11, 1971).
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nents of NEPA, it would appear, now have an opportunity to attack
it effectively. Like Frankenstein's monster, the ultimate threat to
NEPA lies in the possible disaffection of its creator. There is no
question that Congress had something far less awesome in mind when
it fashioned the act. Thus, the future holds two possibilities for
NEPA'. If Congress, dissatisfied with NEPA's implementation, sub
stantially amends it, the result might be a conscious tradeoff of
greater environmental degradation in return for other public benefits.
On the other hand, if the public does not agree to such modification,
then NEPA is likely to continue to be an unusual example of policy
making in which impact exceeds expectations .

